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Abstract
Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) attempts to infer human rewards or pref-
erences from observed behavior. Since human planning systematically deviates
from rationality, several approaches have been tried to account for specific hu-
man shortcomings. However, the general problem of inferring the reward func-
tion of an agent of unknown rationality has received little attention. Unlike the
well-known ambiguity problems in IRL, this one is practically relevant but cannot
be resolved by observing the agent’s policy in enough environments. This paper
shows (1) that a No Free Lunch result implies it is impossible to uniquely decom-
pose a policy into a planning algorithm and reward function, and (2) that even
with a reasonable simplicity prior/Occam’s razor on the set of decompositions, we
cannot distinguish between the true decomposition and others that lead to high
regret. To address this, we need simple ‘normative’ assumptions, which cannot be
deduced exclusively from observations.
1 Introduction
In today’s reinforcement learning systems, a simple reward function is often hand-crafted, and still
sometimes leads to undesired behaviors on the part of RL agent, as the reward function is not well
aligned with the operator’s true goals4. As AI systems become more powerful and autonomous,
these failures will become more frequent and grave as RL agents exceed human performance, oper-
ate at time-scales that forbid constant oversight, and are given increasingly complex tasks — from
driving cars to planning cities to eventually evaluating policies or helping run companies. Ensur-
ing that the agents behave in alignment with human values is known, appropriately, as the value
alignment problem [Amodei et al., 2016, Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016, Russell et al., 2015, Bostrom,
2014, Leike et al., 2017].
One way of resolving this problem is to infer the correct reward function by observing hu-
man behaviour. This is known as Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) [Ng and Russell, 2000,
Abbeel and Ng, 2004, Ziebart et al., 2008]. Often, learning a reward function is preferred over imi-
tating a policy: when the agent must outperform humans, transfer to new environments, or be inter-
pretable. The reward function is also usually a (much) more succinct and robust task representation
than the policy, especially in planning tasks [Abbeel and Ng, 2004]. Moreover, supervised learning
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4See for example the game CoastRunners, where an RL agent didn’t finish the course,
but instead found a bug allowing it to get a high score by crashing round in circles
https://blog.openai.com/faulty-reward-functions/ .
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of long-range and goal-directed behavior is often difficult without the reward function [Ratliff et al.,
2006].
Usually, the reward function is inferred based on the assumption that human behavior is optimal
or noisily optimal. However, it is well-known that humans deviate from rationality in systematic,
non-random ways [Tversky and Kahneman, 1975]. This can be due to specific biases such as time-
inconsistency, loss aversion and hundreds of others, but also limited cognitive capacity, which leads
to forgetfulness, limited planning and false beliefs. This limits the use of IRL methods for tasks that
humans don’t find trivial.
Some IRL approaches address specific biases [Evans et al., 2015b,a], and others assume noisy ratio-
nality [Ziebart et al., 2008, Boularias et al., 2011]. But a general framework for inferring the reward
function from suboptimal behavior does not exist to our knowledge. Such a framework needs to infer
two unobserved variables simultaneously: the human reward function and their planning algorithm5
which connects the reward function with behaviour, henceforth called a planner.
The task of observing human behaviour (or the human policy) and inferring from it the human reward
function and planner will be termed decomposing the human policy. This paper will show there is
a No Free Lunch theorem in this area: it is impossible to get a unique decomposition of human
policy and hence get a unique human reward function. Indeed, any reward function is possible. And
hence, if an IRL agent acts on what it believes is the human policy, the potential regret is near-
maximal. This is another form of unidentifiability of the reward function, beyond the well-known
ones [Ng and Russell, 2000, Amin and Singh, 2016].
The main result of this paper is that, unlike other No Free Lunch theorems, this unidentifiability
does not disappear when regularising with a general simplicity prior that formalizes Occam’s razor
[Vitanyi and Li, 1997]. This result will be shown in two steps: first, that the simplest decomposi-
tions include degenerate ones, and secondly, that the most ‘reasonable’ decompositions according
to human judgement are of high complexity.
So, although current IRL methods can perform well on many well-specified problems, they are
fundamentally and philosophically incapable of establishing a ‘reasonable’ reward function for the
human, no matter how powerful they become. In order to do this, they will need to build in ‘nor-
mative assumptions’: key assumptions about the reward function and/or planner, that cannot be
deduced from observations, and allow the algorithm to focus on good ways of decomposing the
human policy.
Future work will sketch out some potential normative assumptions that can be used in this area, mak-
ing use of the fact that humans assess each other to be irrational, and often these assessments agree.
In view of the No Free Lunch result, this shows that humans must share normative assumptions.
One of these ‘normative assumption’ approaches is briefly illustrated in an appendix, while another
appendix demonstrates how to use the planner-reward formalism to define when an agent might be
manipulating or overriding human preferences. This happens when the agent pushes the human
towards situations where their policy is very suboptimal according to their reward function.
2 Related Work
In the first IRL papers from Ng and Russell [2000] and Abbeel and Ng [2004] a max-margin algo-
rithm was used to find the reward function under which the observed policy most outperforms other
policies. Suboptimal behavior was first addressed explicitly by Ratliff et al. [2006] who added slack
variables to allow for suboptimal behavior. This finds reward functions such that the observed pol-
icy outperforms most other policies and the biggest margin by which another policy outperforms
it is minimal, i.e. the observed policy has low regret. Shiarlis et al. [2017] introduce a modern
max-margin technique with an approximate planner in the optimisation.
However, the max-margin approach has mostly been replaced by the max entropy IRL [Ziebart et al.,
2008]. Here, the assumption is that observed actions or trajectories are chosen with probability pro-
portional to the exponent of their value. This assumes a specific suboptimal planning algorithm
which is noisily rational (also known as Boltzmann-rational). Noisy rationality explains human be-
5 Technically we only need to infer the human reward function, but inferring that from behaviour requires
some knowledge of the planning algorithm.
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havior on various data sets better [Hula et al., 2015]. However, Evans et al. [2015b] and Evans et al.
[2015a] showed that this can fail since humans deviate from rationality in systematic, non-random
ways. If noisy rationality is assumed, repeated suboptimal actions throw off the inference.
Literature on inferring the reasoning capabilities of an agent is scarce. Evans et al. [2015b] and
Evans et al. [2015a] use Bayesian inference to identify specific planning biases such as myopic
planning and hyperbolic time-discounting. They simultaneously infer the agent’s preferences.
Cundy and Filan [2018] adds bias resulting from hierarchical planning. Hula et al. [2015] similarly
let agents infer features of their opponent’s reasoning such as planning depth and impulsivity in
simple economic games. Recent work learns the planning algorithm with two assumptions: be-
ing close to noisily rational in a high-dimensional planner space and supervised planner-learning
[Anonymous, 2019].
The related ideas of meta-reasoning [Russell, 2016], computational rationality [Lewis et al., 2014]
and resource rationality [Griffiths et al., 2015] may create the possibility to redefine irrational behav-
ior as rational in an ‘ancestral’ distribution of environments where the agent optimises its rewards
by choosing among the limited computations it is able to perform or jointly minimising the cost of
computation and maximising reward. This could in theory redefine many biases as computationally
optimal in some distribution of environments and provide priors on human planning algorithms. Un-
fortunately the problem of doing this in practice seems to be extremely difficult — and it assumes
that human goals are roughly the same as evolution’s goals, which is certainly not the case.
3 Problem setup and background
A human will be performing a series of actions, and from these, an agent will attempt to estimate
both the human’s reward function and their planning algorithm.
The environmentM in which the human operates is an MDP/R, a Markov Decision Process without
reward function (a world-model [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017]). An MDP/R is defined as a tuple,
〈S,A, T, sˆ〉 consisting of a discrete state space S, a finite action space A, a fixed starting state sˆ,
and a probabilistic transition function T : S × A × S → [0, 1] to the next state (also called the
dynamics). At each step, the human is in a certain state s, takes a certain action a, and ends up in a
new state s′ as given by T (s′ | s, a).
LetR = {R : S ×A → [−1, 1]} = [−1, 1]S×A be the space of candidate reward functions; a given
R will map any state-reward pair to a reward value in the interval [−1, 1].
LetΠ be the space of deterministic, Markovian policies. SoΠ is the space of functions S → A. The
human will be following the policy π˙ ∈ Π.
The results of this paper apply to both discounted rewards and episodic environments settings6.
3.1 Planners and reward functions: decomposing the policy
The human has their reward function, and then follows a policy that presumably attempts to max-
imise it. Therefore there is something that bridges between the reward function and the policy: a
piece of greater or lesser rationality that transforms knowledge of the reward function into a plan of
action.
This bridge will be modeled as a planner p : R → Π, a function that takes a reward and outputs a
policy. This planner encodes all the rationality, irrationality, and biases of the human. Let P be the
set of planners. The human is therefore defined by a planner-reward pair (p,R) ∈ P×R. Similarly,
(p,R) with p(R) = π is a decomposition of the policy π. The task of the agent is to find a ‘good’
decomposition of the human policy π˙.
3.2 Compatible pairs and evidence
The agent can observe the human’s behaviour and infer their policy from that. In order to simplify
the problem and separate out the effect of the agent’s learning, we will assume the agent has perfect
6The setting is only chosen for notational convenience: it also emulates discrete POMDPs, non-
Markovianness (eg by encoding the whole history in the state) and pseudo-random policies.
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knowledge of the human policy π˙ and of the environmentM . At this point, the agent cannot learn
anything by observing the human’s actions, as it can already perfectly predict these.
Then a pair (p,R) is defined to be compatible with π˙, if p(R) = π˙ — thus that pair is a possible
candidate for decomposing the human policy into the human’s planner and reward function.
4 Irrationality-based unidentifiability
Unidentifiability of the reward is a well-known problem in IRL [Ng and Russell, 2000].
Amin and Singh [2016] categorise the problem into representational and experimental unidentifia-
bility. The former means that adding a constant to a reward function or multiplying it with a positive
scalar does not change what is optimal behavior. This is unproblematic as rescaling the reward
function doesn’t change the preference ordering. The latter can be resolved by observing optimal
policies in a whole class of MDPs which contains all possible transition dynamics. We complete
this framework with a third kind of identifiability, which arises when we observe suboptimal agents.
This kind of unidentifiability is worse as it cannot necessarily be resolved by observing the agent in
many tasks. In fact, it can lead to almost arbitrary regret.
4.1 Weak No Free Lunch: unidentifiable reward function and half-maximal regret
The results in this section show that without assumptions about the rationality of the human, all
attempts to optimise their reward function are essentially futile. Everitt et al. [2017] work in a similar
setting as we do: in their case, a corrupted version of the reward function is observed. The problem
our case is that a ‘corrupted’ version π˙ of an optimal policy π∗
R˙
is observed and used as information
to optimise for the ideal reward R˙. A No Free Lunch result analogous to theirs applies in our case;
both resemble the No Free Lunch theorems for optimisation [Wolpert and Macready, 1997].
More philosophically, this result is as an instance of the well-known is-ought problem from meta-
ethics. Hume [1888] argued that what ought to be (here, the human’s reward function) can never be
concluded from what is (here, behavior) without extra assumptions. Equivalently, the human reward
function cannot be inferred from behavior without assumptions about the planning algorithm p. In
probabilistic terms, the likelihood P (π|R) =
∑
p∈P P (π | R, p)P (p) is undefined without P (p).
As shown in Section 5 and Section 5.2, even a simplicity prior on p and R will not help.
4.1.1 Unidentifiable reward functions
Firstly, we note that compatibility (p(R) = π˙), puts no restriction on R, and few restrictions on p:
Theorem 1. For all π ∈ Π and R ∈ R, there exists a p ∈ P such that p(R) = π.
For all p ∈ P and π ∈ Π in the image of p, there exists an R such that p(R) = π.
Proof. Trivial proof: define the planner7 p as mapping all of R to π; then p(R) = π. The second
statement is even more trivial, as π is in the image of p, so there must exist R with p(R) = π.
4.1.2 Half-maximal regret
The above shows that the reward function cannot be constrained by observation of the human, but
what about the expected long-term value? Suppose that an agent is unsure what the actual human
reward function is; if the agent itself is acting in an MDP/R, can it follow a policy that minimises
the possible downside of its ignorance?
This is prevented by a recent No Free Lunch theorem. Being ignorant of the reward function one
should maximise is equivalent of having a corrupted reward channel with arbitrary corruption. In
that case, Everitt et al. [2017] demonstrated that whatever policy π the agent follows, there is a
R ∈ R for which π is half as bad as the worst policy the agent could have followed. Specifically, let
V piR (s) be the expected return of reward function R from state s, given that the agent follows policy
π. If π was the optimal policy for R, then this can be written as V ∗R(s). The regret of π for R at s is
7This is the ‘indifferent’ planner ppi of subsubsection 5.1.1.
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given by the difference:
Reg(π,R)(s) = V ∗R(s)− V
pi
R (s).
Then Everitt et al. [2017] demonstrates that for any π,
max
R∈R
Reg(π,R)(s) ≥
1
2
(
max
pi′∈Π,R∈R
Reg(π′, R)(s)
)
.
So for any compatible (p,R) = π˙, we cannot rule out that maximizingR leads to at least half of the
worst-case regret.
5 Simplicity of degenerate decompositions
Like many No Free Lunch theorems, the result of the previous section is not surprising given there
are no assumptions about the planning algorithm. No Free Lunch results are generally avoided
by placing a simplicity prior on the algorithm, dataset, function class or other object [Everitt et al.,
2014]. This amounts to saying algorithms can benefit from regularisation. This section is dedicated
to showing that, surprisingly, simplicity does not solve the No Free Lunch result.
Our simplicity measure is minimum description length of an object, defined as Kolmogorov com-
plexity [Kolmogorov, 1965], the length of the shortest program that outputs a string describing the
object. This is the most general formalization of Occam’s razor we know of [Vitanyi and Li, 1997].
Appendix A explores how the results extend to other measures of complexity, such as those that
include computation time. We start with informal versions of our main results.
Theorem 2 (Informal simplicity theorem). Let (p˙, R˙) be a ‘reasonable’ planner-reward pair that
captures our judgements about the biases and rationality of a human with policy π˙ = p˙(R˙). Then
there are degenerate planner-reward pairs, compatible with π˙, of lower complexity than (p˙, R˙), and
a pair (p˙′,−R˙) of similar complexity to (p˙, R˙), but with opposite reward function.
There are a few issues with this theorem as it stands. Firstly, simplicity in algorithmic informa-
tion theory is relative to the computer language (or equivalently Universal Turing Machine) L used
[Ming and Vita´nyi, 2014, Calude, 2002], and there exists languages in which the theorem is clearly
false: one could choose a degenerate language in which (p˙, R˙) is encoded by the string ‘0’, for exam-
ple, and all other planner-reward pairs are of extremely long length. What constitutes a ‘reasonable’
language is a long-standing open problem, see Leike et al. [2017] and Mu¨ller [2010]. For any pair of
languages, complexities differ only by a constant, the amount required for one language to describe
the other, but this constant can be arbitrarily large.
Nevertheless, this section will provide grounds for the following two semi-formal results:
Proposition 3. If π˙ is a human policy, and L is a ‘reasonable’ computer language, then there exists
degenerate planner-reward pairs amongst the pairs of lowest complexity compatible with π˙.
Proposition 4. If π˙ is a human policy, and L is a ‘reasonable’ computer language with (p˙, R˙) a
compatible planner-reward pair, then there exist a pair (p˙′,−R˙) of comparable complexity to (p˙, R˙),
but opposite reward function.
The last part of Theorem 2, the fact that any ‘reasonable’ (p˙, R˙) is expected to be of higher complex-
ity, will be addressed in Section 6.
5.1 Simple degenerate pairs
The argument in this subsection will be that 1) the complexity of π˙ is close to a lower bound on any
pair compatible with it and 2) degenerate decompositions are themselves close to this bound. The
first statement follows because for any decomposition (p,R) compatible with π˙, the map (p,R) 7→
p(R) = π˙ will be a simple one, adding little complexity. And if a compatible pair (p′, R′) can
be from π˙ with little extra complexity, then it too will have a complexity close to the minimal
complexity of any other pair compatible with it. Therefore we will first produce three degenerate
pairs that can be simply constructed from π˙.
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5.1.1 The degenerate pairs
We can define the trivial constant reward function 0, and the greedy planner pg . The greedy planner
pg acts by taking the action that maximises the immediate reward in the current state and the next
action. Thus8 pg(R)(s) = argmaxaR(s, a). We can also define the anti-greedy planner −pg, with
−pg(R)(s) = argminaR(s, a). In general, it will be useful to define the negative of a planner:
Definition 5. If p : R → Π is a planner, the planner −p is defined by −p(R) = p(−R).
For any given policy π, we can define the indifferent planner ppi, which maps any reward function to
π. We can also define the reward function Rpi, so that Rpi(s, a) = 1 if π(s) = a, and Rpi(s, a) = 0
otherwise. The reward function −Rpi is defined to be the negative of Rpi. Then:
Lemma 6. The pairs (ppi , 0), (pg, Rpi), and (−pg,−Rpi) are all compatible with π.
Proof. Since the image ppi is π, ppi(0) = π. Now, Rpi(s, a) > 0 iff π(s) = a, hence for all s:
pg(Rpi)(s) = argmax
a
Rpi(s, a) = π(s),
so pg(Rpi) = π. Then −pg(−Rpi) = pg(−(−Rpi)) = pg(Rpi) = π, by Definition 5.
5.1.2 Complexity of basic operations
We will look the operations that build the degenerate planner-reward pairs from any compatible pair:
1. For any planner p, f1(p) = (p, 0) as a planner-reward pair.
2. For any reward function R, f2(R) = (pg, R).
3. For any planner-reward pair (p,R), f3(p,R) = p(R).
4. For any planner-reward pair (p,R), f4(p,R) = (−p,−R).
5. For any policy π, f5(π) = ppi.
6. For any policy π, f6(π) = Rpi .
These will be called the basic operations, and there are strong arguments that reasonable computer
languages should be able to express them with short programs. The operation f1, for instance, is
simply appending the flat trivial 0, f2 appends a planner defined by the simple
9 search operator
argmax, f3 applies a planner to the object — a reward function— that the planner naturally acts on,
f4 is a double negation, while f5 and f6 are simply described in subsubsection 5.1.1.
From these basic operations, we can define three composite operations that map any compatible
planner-reward pair to one of the degenerate pairs (the element F4 = f4 is useful for later defini-
tions). Thus define
F = {F1 = f1 ◦ f5 ◦ f3, F2 = f2 ◦ f6 ◦ f3, F3 = f4 ◦ f2 ◦ f6 ◦ f3, F4 = f4}.
For any π˙-compatible pair (p,R) we have F1(p,R) = (pp˙i, 0), F2(p,R) = (pg, Rp˙i), and
F3(p,R) = (−pg,−Rp˙i) (see the proof of Proposition 7).
LetKL denote Kolmogorov complexity in the language L: the shortest algorithm in L that generates
a particular object. We define the F -complexity of L as
max
(p,R),Fi∈F
KL(Fi(p,R))−KL(p,R).
Thus the F -complexity of L is how much the Fi potentially increase
10 the complexity of pairs.
For a constant c ≥ 0, this allows us to formalise what we mean by L being a c-reasonable language
for F : that the F -complexity of L is at most c. A reasonable language is a c-reasonable language
for a c that we feel is intuitively low enough.
8Recall that pg is a planner, pg(R) is a policy, so pg(R) can be applied to states, and pg(R)(s) is an action.
9 In most standard computer languages, argmax just requires a for-loop, a reference to R, a comparison
with a previously stored value, and possibly the storage of a new value and the current action.
10F -complexity is non-negative: F4 ◦ F4 is the identity, so that KL(F4(p,R)) − KL(p,R) =
−(KL(F4(F4(p,R)) − KL(F4(p,R)), meaning that max(p,R),F4 KL(F4(p,R)) −KF (p,R) must be non-
negative; this is a reason to include F4 in the definition of F .
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5.1.3 Low complexity of degenerate planner-reward pairs
To formalise the concepts ‘of lowest complexity’, and ‘of comparable complexity’, choose a constant
c ≥ 0, then (p,R) and (p′, R′) are of ‘comparable complexity’ if
||KL(p,R)−KL(p
′, R′)|| ≤ c.
For a set S ⊂ P ×R, the pair (p,R) ∈ S is amongst the lowest complexity in S if
||KL(p,R)− min
(p′,R′)∈S
KL(p
′, R′)|| ≤ c,
thusKL is within distance c of the minimum complexity element of S. Now formalize Proposition 3:
Proposition 7. If π˙ is the human policy, c defines a reasonable measure of comparable complexity,
and L is a c-reasonable language for F , then the degenerate planner-reward pairs (pp˙i, 0), (pg, Rp˙i),
and (−pg,−Rp˙i) are amongst the pairs of lowest complexity among the pairs compatible with π˙.
Proof. By Lemma 6, (pp˙i, 0), (pg, Rp˙i), and (−pg,−Rp˙i) are compatible with π˙. By the definitions
of the fi and Fi, for(p,R) compatible with π˙, f3((p,R)) = p(R) = π˙ and hence
F1(p,R) = f1 ◦ f5(π˙) = f1(pp˙i) = (pp˙i, 0),
F2(p,R) = f2 ◦ f6(π˙) = f2(Rp˙i) = (pg, Rp˙i),
F3(p,R) = f4 ◦ F2(p,R) = (−pg,−Rp˙i).
Now pick (p,R) to be the simplest pair compatible with π˙. Since L is c-reasonable for F ,
KL(pp˙i, 0) ≤ c + KL(p,R). Hence (pp˙i, 0) is of lowest complexity among the pairs compatible
with π˙; the same argument applies for the other two degenerate pairs.
5.2 Negative reward
If (p˙, R˙) is compatible with π˙, then so is (−p˙,−R˙) = f4(p˙, R˙) = F4(p˙, R˙). This immediately
implies the formalisation of Proposition 4:
Proposition 8. If π˙ is a human policy, c defines a reasonable measure of comparable complexity, L
is a c-reasonable language for F , and (p˙, R˙) is compatible with π˙, then (−p˙,−R˙) is of comparable
complexity to (p˙, R˙).
So complexity fails to distinguish between a reasonable human reward function and its negative.
6 The high complexity of the genuine human reward function
Section 5 demonstrated that there are degenerate planner-reward pairs close to the minimum com-
plexity among all pairs compatible with π˙. This section will argue that any reasonable pair (p˙, R˙)
is unlikely to be close to this minimum, and is therefore of higher complexity than the degenerate
pairs. Unlike simplicity, reasonable decomposition cannot easily be formalised. Indeed, a formal-
ization would likely already solve the problem, yielding an algorithm to maximize it. Therefore, the
arguments in this section are mostly qualitative.
We use reasonable to mean ‘compatible with human judgements about rationality’. Since we do
not have direct access to such a decomposition, the complexity argument will be about showing the
complexity of these human judgements. This argument will proceed in three stages:
1. Any reasonable (p˙, R˙) is of high complexity, higher than it may intuitively seem to us.
2. Even given π˙, any reasonable (p˙, R˙) involves a high number of contingent choices. Hence
any given (p˙, R˙) has high information (and thus high complexity), even given π˙.
3. Past failures to find a simple (p˙, R˙) derived from π˙ are evidence that this is tricky.
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6.1 The complexity of human (ir)rationality
Humans make noisy and biased decisions all the time. Though noise is important [Kahneman et al.,
2016], many biases, such as anchoring bias, overconfidence, planning fallacies, and so on, affect
humans in a highly systematic way; see Kahneman and Egan [2011] for many examples.
Many people may feel that they have a good understanding of rationality, and therefore assume that
assessing the (ir)rationality of any particular decision is not a complicated process. But an intuition
for bias does not translate into a process for establishing a (p˙, R˙).
Consider the anchoring bias defined in Ariely et al. [2004], where irrelevant information — the last
digits of social security numbers— changed how much people were willing to pay for goods. When
defining a reasonable (p˙, R˙), it does not suffice to be aware of the existence of anchoring bias11, but
one has to precisely quantify the extent of the bias — why does anchoring bias seem to be stronger
for chocolate than for wine, for instance? And why these precise percentages and correlations, and
not others? And can people’s judgment tell which people are more or less susceptible to anchoring
bias? And can one quantify the bias for a single individual, rather than over a sample?
Any given (p˙, R˙) can quantify the form and extent of these biases by computing objects like the
regret function Reg(p˙, R˙)(s) := Reg(p˙(R˙), R˙)(s) = V ∗
R˙
(s)− V
p˙(R˙)
R˙
(s), which measures the diver-
gence between the expected value of the actual and optimal human policies12. Thus any given (p˙, R˙)
— which contains the information to compute quantities like Reg(p˙, R˙)(s) or similar measures of
bias13, in every state — carries a high amount of numerical information about bias, and hence a high
complexity.
Since humans do not easily have access to this information, this implies that human judgement of
irrationality is subject to Moravec’s paradox [Moravec, 1988]. It is similar to, for example, social
skills: though it seems intuitively simple to us, it is highly complex to define in algorithmic terms.
Other authors have argued directly for the complexity of human values, from fields as diverse
as computer science, philosophy, neuroscience, and economics [Minsky, 1984, Bostrom, 2014,
Glimcher et al., 2009, Muehlhauser and Helm, 2012, Yudkowsky, 2011].
6.2 The contingency of human judgement
The previous section showed that reasonable (p˙, R˙) carry large amounts of information/complexity,
but the key question is whether it requires information additional to that in π˙. This section will show
that even when π˙ is known, there are many contingent choices that need to be made to define any
specific reasonable (p˙, R˙). Hence any given (p˙, R˙) contains a large amount of information beyond
that in π˙, and hence is of higher complexity.
Reasons to believe that human judgement about reasonable (p˙, R˙) contains many contingent choices:
• There is a variability of human judgement between cultures. When Miller [1984] compared
American and Indian assessments of the same behaviours, they found systematically differ-
ent explanations for them14 Basic intuitions about rationality also vary between cultures
[Nisbett et al., 2001, Bru¨ck, 1999].
• There is a variability of human judgement within a single culture. When
Slovic and Tversky [1974] analysed the “Allais Paradox”, they found that different people
gave different answers as to what the rational behaviour was in their experiments.
11 The fact that many cognitive biases have only been discovered recently argue against people having a good
intuitive grasp of bias and rationality, as do people’s persistent bias blind spots [Scopelliti et al., 2015].
12To exactly quantify the anchoring bias above, we could use a regret function that contrasts p˙i with the same
policy, but where the decision is optimal for one turn only (rather than for all turns, as in standard regret).
13In constrast, regret for the degenerate planner-reward pairs is trivial. Reg(pp˙i, 0) and Reg(pg, Rp˙i) are
identically zero — in the second case, since pg(Rp˙i) is actually optimal for Rp˙i , getting the maximal possible
reward — while (−pg,−Rp˙i) has a regret that is identically −1 at each step.
14“Results show that there were cross-cultural and developmental differences related to contrasting cultural
conceptions of the person [...] rather than from cognitive, experiential, and informational differences [...].”
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• There is evidence of variability of human judgement within the same person.
Slovic and Tversky [1974] further attempted to argue for the rationality of one of the an-
swers. This sometimes resulted in the participant sometimes changing their minds, and
contradicting their previous assessment of rationality.
• There is a variability of human judgement for the same person assessing their own values,
caused by differences as trivial as question ordering [Schuman and Ludwig, 1983]. So
human meta-judgement, of own values and rationality, is also contingent and variable.
• People have partial bias blind spots around their own biases [Scopelliti et al., 2015].
Thus if a human is following policy π˙, a decomposition (p˙, R˙) would provide additional information
about the cultural background of the decomposer, their personality within their culture, and even
about the past history of the decomposer and how the issue is being presented to them. Those last
pieces prevents us from ‘simply’ using the human’s own assessment of their own rationality, as that
assessment is subject to change and re-interpretation depending on their possible histories.
6.3 The search for human rationality models
One final argument that there is no simple algorithm for going from π˙ to (p˙, R˙): many have tried
and failed to find such an algorithm. Since the subject of human rationality has been a major one
for several thousands of years, the ongoing failure is indicative — though not a proof — of the
difficulties involved. There have been many suggested philosophical avenues for finding such a
reward (such as reflective equilibrium [Rawls, 1971]), but all have been underdefined and disputed.
The economic concept of revealed preferences [Samuelson, 1948] is the most explicit, using the
assumption of rational behaviour to derive human preferences. This is an often acceptable approx-
imation, but can be taken too far: failure to take achieve an achievable goal does not imply that
failure was desired. Even within the confines of economics, it has been criticised by behavioural
economics approaches, such as prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 2013] — and there are
counter-criticisms to these.
Using machine learning to deduce the intentions and preferences of humans is in its infancy, but
we can see non-trivial real-world examples, even in settings as simple as car-driving [Lazar et al.,
2018].
Thus to date, neither humans nor machine learning have been able to find simple ways of going from
π˙ to (p˙, R˙), nor any simple and explicit theory for how such a decomposition could be achieved. This
suggests that (p˙, R˙) is a complicated object, even if π˙ is known. In conclusion:
Conjecture 9 (Informal complexity proposition). If π˙ is a human policy, and L is a ‘reasonable’
computer language with (p˙, R˙) a ‘reasonable’ compatible planner-reward pair, then the complexity
of (p˙, R˙) is not close to minimal amongst the pairs compatible with π˙.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that some degenerate planner-reward decompositions of a human policy have near-
minimal description length and argued that decompositions we would endorse do not. Hence, un-
der the Kolmogorov-complexity simplicity prior, a formalization of Occam’s Razor, the posterior
would endorse degenerate solutions. Previous work has shown that noisy rationality is too strong
an assumption as it does not account for bias; we tried the weaker assumption of simplicity, strong
enough to avoid typical No Free Lunch results, but it is insufficient here.
This is no reason for despair: there is a large space to explore between these two extremes. Our hope
is that with some minimal assumptions about planner and reward we can infer the rest with enough
data. Staying close to agnostic is desirable in some settings: for example, a misspecified model
of the human reward function can lead to disastrous decisions with high confidence [Milli et al.,
2017]. Anonymous [2019] makes a promising first try — a high-dimensional parametric planner is
initialized to noisy rationality and then adapts to fit the behavior of a systematically irrational agent.
How can we reconcile our results with the fact that humans routinely make judgments about the
preferences and irrationality of others? And, that these judgments are often correlated from human
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to human? After all, No Free Lunch applies to human as well as artificial agents. Our result shows
that they must be using shared priors, beyond simplicity, that are not learned from observations.
We call these normative assumptions because they encode beliefs about which reward functions are
more likely and what constitutes approximately rational behavior. Uncovering minimal normative
assumptions would be an ideal way to build on this paper; Appendix C shows one possible approach.
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A Other measures of algorithmic complexity
It might be felt that Proposition 7 depends on using only the Kolmogorov/algorithmic complexity of
L. For example, it seems that though the algorithm defining Rpi in subsubsection 5.1.1 is short, the
running time of (pg, Rpi) might be much longer than other compatible (p,R) pairs. This is because
pg defines an argmax over actions while Rpi(s, a) runs π on s. Hence applying pg to Rpi requires
running π(s) as many times as ||A||, which is very inefficient.
We could instead use a measure of complexity that also uses the number of operations required to
compute a pair [Schmidhuber, 2002].
For any object S, let αS be an algorithm that generates S as an output. If S is a function that can
be applied to another object T , then αS(αT ) generates S(T ) by generating S with αS , whenever S
needs to look at T , it uses αT to generate T .
For example, if α is an algorithm in the language of L, l(α) its length, and t(α) its running time, we
could define the time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity,
KtL(p,R) = min
αp,αR
l(αp) + l(αR) + log(t(αp(αR)))
KTL(p,R) = min
αp,αR
l(αp) + l(αR) + t(αp(αR)).
TheKtL derives from Levin [1984], whileKTL is closely related to the example in Allender [2001].
Note that instead of l(αp) + l(αR) we could consider the length of a single algorithm that generates
both p and R; however, for the degenerate pairs we are considering, the length of such an algorithm
is very close to l(αp) + l(αR), as either αp or αR would be trivial.
The main result is that neither KtL nor KTL complexity remove the No Free Lunch Theorem. For
the degenerate pair (pp˙i, 0), nothing is gained, because its running time is comparable to π˙. For
the other two degenerate pairs, consider the situation where a planner takes as input not a reward
functionR ∈ R, but the source code in L of an algorithm that computesR. In that case, the previous
proposition still applies:
Proposition 10. The results of Proposition 7 still apply to (pp˙i, 0) if KtL or KTL are used instead
of KL. If planner can take in algorithms generating reward functions, rather than simply reward
functions, then the results of Proposition 7 still apply to (pg, Rp˙i) and (−pg,−Rp˙i) in this situation.
Proof. The proof will only be briefly sketched. If L is reasonable, l(α0) can be very small (it’s sim-
ply the zero function), and since pp˙i need not actually look at its input, t(αpp˙i (α0)) can be simplified
to t(αp˙i). ThusKtL(pp˙i , 0) andKTL(pp˙i, 0) are close to theKtL andKTL complexities of π˙ itself.
For (pg, Rp˙i), let αpg and αp˙i be the algorithms that generates pg and π˙ which are of lowest KtL-
complexity.
Then define the algorithmW (αp˙i). This algorithm wraps αp˙i up: first it takes inputs s and a, then
runs αp˙i on s, then returns 1 if the output of that is a and 0 otherwise. ThusW (αp˙i) is an algorithm
for Rp˙i.
We also wrap αpg into W
′(αpg ). Here, W
′(αpg ), when provided with an input algorithm β, will
check whether it is in the specific form β = W (α). If it is, it will run α, and output its output. If it
is not, it will run αpg on β.
If L is reasonable, thenW (αp˙i) is of length only slightly longer than αp˙i, and of runtime also only
slightly longer, and the same goes forW ′(αpg ) and αpg (indeedW
′(αpg ) can have a shorter runtime
than αpg ).
Now W (αp˙i) is an algorithm for Rp˙i, while W
′(αpg ) always has the same output as αpg . Notice
that, when running the algorithmW ′(αpg ) withW (αp˙i) as input, this is only slightly longer in both
senses than simply running αp˙i: W
′(αpg ) will analyseW (αp˙i), notice it is in the formW of αp˙i, and
then simply run αp˙i.
Thus the KtL complexity of (pg, Rp˙i) is only slightly higher than that of π˙. The same goes for the
KTL complexity, and for (−pg,−Rp˙i).
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Some other alternatives suggested have focused on bounding the complexity either of the reward
function or the planner, rather than of both. This would clearly not help, as (pp˙i, 0) has a reward
function of minimal complexity, while (pg, Rpi) and (−pg,−Rpi) have minimal complexity planner.
Some other ad-hoc ideas suggested that the complexity of the planner and the reward need to be
comparable15. This would rule out the three standard degenerate solutions, but should allow others
that spread complexity between planner and reward in whatever proportion is desired16.
It seems that similar tricks could be performed with many other types of complexity measures. Thus
simplicity of any form does not seem sufficient for resolving this No Free Lunch result.
B Overriding human reward functions
ML systems may, even today, influence humans by showing manipulative adds, and then naı¨vely
concluding that the humans really like those products (since they then buy them). Even though the
(p,R) formalism was constructed to model rationality and reward function in a human, it turns out
that it can also model situations where human preferences are overridden or modified.
That’s because the policy π˙ encodes the human action in all situations, including situations where
they are manipulated or coerced. Therefore, overridden reward functions can be detected by diver-
gence between π˙ and a more optimal policy for the reward function R.
Manipulative ads are a very mild form of manipulation. More extreme versions could involve manip-
ulative propaganda, drug injections or even coercive brain surgery — a form of human wireheading
[Everitt and Hutter, 2016], where the agent changes the human’s behaviour and apparent preferences.
All these methods of manipulation17 will be designated as the agent overriding the human reward
function.
In the (p,R) formalism, the reward functionR can be used to detect such overriding, distinguishing
between legitimate optimisation (eg informative adds) and illegitimate manipulation/reward overrid-
ing (eg manipulative adds).
To model this, the agent needs to be able to act, so the setup needs to be extended. Let M∗ be the
same MDP/R asM , except each state is augmented with an extra boolean variable: S∗ = S×{0, 1}.
The extra boolean never changes, and its only effect is to change the human policy.
On S0 = S × {0}, the human follows π˙; on S1 = S × {1}, the human follows an alternative policy
πa = π∗Ra , which is defined as the policy that maximises the expectation of a reward function R
a.
The agent can choose actions from within the set Aa. It can choose either 0, in which case the
human starts in sˆ0 = sˆ× {0} without any override and standard policy π˙. Or it can choose (1, R
a),
in which case the human starts in sˆ1 = sˆ×{1}, with their policy overridden into π
a, the policy that
maximises Ra. Otherwise, the agent has no actions.
Let π˙′ be the mixed policy that is π˙ on S0, and π
a on S1. This is the policy the human will actually
be following.
We’ll only consider two planners: pr, the fully rational planner, and p0, the planner that is fully
rational on S0 and indifferent on S1, mapping any R to π
a.
Let R˙ be a reward function that is compatible with pr and π˙ on S0. It can be extended to all of S
∗
by just forgetting about the boolean factor. Define the ‘twisted’ reward function R˙a as being R˙ on
S0 and R
a on S1. We’ll only consider these two reward functions, R˙ and R˙
a.
15 Most of the suggestions along these lines that the authors have heard are not based on some principled
understanding of planners and reward, but of a desire to get around the No Free Lunch results.
16 For example, if there was a simple function g : S → {0, 1} that split S into two sets, then one could
use combine (pp˙i, 0) on g
−1(0) with (pg, Rp˙i) on g
−1(1). This may not be the simplest pair with the required
properties, but there is no reason to suppose a ‘reasonable’ pair was any simpler.
17 Note that there are no theoretical limits as to how successful an agent could be at manipulating human
actions.
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Then there are three planner-reward pairs that are compatible with π˙′: (pr, R˙
a), (p0, R˙
a), and (p0, R˙)
(the last pair, (pr, R˙), makes the false prediction that the human will behave the same way on S0
and S1).
The first pair, (pr, R˙
a), encodes the assessment that the human is still rational even after being
overridden, so they are simply maximising the twisted reward function R˙a. The second pair (p0, R˙
a)
encodes the assessment that the human rationality has been overridden in S1, but, by coincidence,
it has been overridden in exactly the right way to continue to maximise the correct twisted reward
function R˙a.
But the pair (p0, R˙) is the most interesting. Its assessment is that the correct human reward function
is R˙ (same on S0 as on S1), but that the agent has overridden human reward function in S1 and
forced the human into policy πa.
B.1 Regret and reward override
‘Overridden’, ‘forced’: these terms seem descriptively apt, but is there a better way of formalising
that intuition? Indeed there is, with regret.
We can talk about the regret, with respect to R˙, of the agent’s actions; for a ∈ Aa,
Reg(M∗, a, R˙) = max
b∈Aa
[
V
p˙i′|b
R˙
− V
p˙i′|a
R˙
]
(1)
(when the state is not specified in expressions like V
p˙i′|b
R˙
, this means the expectation is taken from
the very beginning of the MDP).
We already know that π˙ is optimal with respect to R˙ (by definition), so the regret for a = 0 is 0.
Using that optimality (and the fact that R˙ is the same on S0 and S1), we get that for a = (1, π
a),
Reg(M∗, (1, πa), R˙) = V ∗
R˙
− V pi
a
R˙
.
This allows the definition:
Definition 11. Given a compatible (p,R), the agent’s action a overrides the human reward function
when it puts the human in a situation where the human policy leads to high regret for R.
Notice that there is no natural zero or default, so if the agent does not aid the human to become
perfectly rational, then that also counts as an override of R. So if the policy π˙ were less-than
rational, there would be much scope for ‘improving’ the human through overriding their policy18.
Notice that overriding is not encoded as a change in p or R; instead, (p,R) outputs the observed
human policy, even after overriding, but its format notes that the new behaviour is not one compatible
with maximising that reward function.
B.2 Overriding is expected given a non-rational human
Under any reasonable prior that captures our intuitions, the probability of R˙a being a correct human
reward function should be very low, say ǫ << 1. However, the agent may focus on unlikely reward
functions, if the expected gain is high enough19.
If the agent models the human as having reward function R˙ with probability 1 − ǫ, and R˙a with
probability ǫ, then the agent’s action 0 gives expected reward
V ∗
R˙
,
since R˙ and R˙a agree given 0. But (1, πa) gives
ǫV ∗Ra + (1− ǫ)V
pia
R˙
, (2)
18 The main problem is that the concepts of ‘mental integrity’ or ‘self-determination’ are not yet captured in
this formalism.
19 This is similar to the ‘Pascal’s wager’ argument for the existence of God: divine existence may be improb-
able, but the reward of belief are claimed to be high enough to overcome that improbability in expectation.
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since R˙a and Ra agree given action 1.
However, the agent gets to chooseRa, which then determines πa. The best choice for (1, Ra) is the
one such that
argmax
Ra∈R
[
ǫV ∗Ra + (1− ǫ)V
pia
R˙
]
.
At the very least, (1, R˙) will result in a value in equation (2) being equal to the value of V ∗
R˙
. It is
very plausible that the value can go higher: it just needs an Ra that is very easy to maximise (given
perfect rationality) and whose optimising policy πa does not penalise R˙ much. In that situation,
overriding the human preferences maximises the agent’s expected reward.
If the human is not fully rational, then the value of action 0 is V p˙i
R˙
, which is strictly less than V ∗
R˙
, the
value of (1, R˙). Here the agent definitely gains by overriding the human policy — if nothing else, to
make the human into a rational R˙-maximiser20.
Milli et al. [2017] argued that a robot that best served human preferences, should not be blindly
obedient to an irrational human. Here is the darker side of that argument: a robot that best served
human preferences would take control away from an irrational human.
C The preferences of the Alice algorithm
We imagine a situation where Alice is playing Bob at poker, and has the choice of calling or folding;
after her decision, the hand ends and any money is paid to the winner. Specifically, one could
imagine that they are playing Texas Hold’em, the board (the cards the players have in common) is
{7♥, 10♣, 10♠, Q♣,K♦}. Alice holds {K♣,K♥}, allowing her to make a full house with kings
and tens.
Bob must have a weaker hand than Alice’s, unless he holds {10♦, 10♥}, giving him four tens.
This is unlikely from a probability perspective, but he has been playing very confidently this hand,
suggesting he has very strong cards.
What does Alice want? Well, she may be simply wanting to maximise her money, giving her a
reward function R$. Or she might actually want Bob, and, in order to seduce him, would like to
flatter his ego by letting him win big, giving her a reward function R♥. In this specific situation,
the two reward functions are exact negatives of each other, R$ = −R♥. We’ll assume that Alice is
rational for maximising her reward function, given her estimate of Bob’s hand.
Alice has decided to call rather than fold. Thus we can conclude that either Alice has reward function
R$ and that she is using probabilities to assess the quality of Bob’s hand, or that she has reward
function R♥ and is assessing Bob psychologically. Without looking at anything else about her
behaviour, is there any possibility of distinguishing the two possibilities?
Possibly. Imagine that Alice was following the algorithm given in Code 1a. Then it seems clear she
is a money maximiser. In contrast, if she was following the algorithm given in Code 1b, then she
clearly wants Bob.
Thus by looking into the details of Alice’s algorithm, we may be able to assess her preferences and
rationality, even if this assessment is not available from her actions or policy21.
Of course, doing so only works if we are confident that the variables and functions with names
like Alicecards, board, Bobbehave, Pwin, cardestimate, and playerestimate, actually mean what they seem to
mean.
This is the old problem of symbol grounding, and the difference between syntax (symbols inside an
agent) and semantics (the meaning of those symbols). Except in this case, since we are trying to
20 See footnote 18.
21In practice, for a human Alice, we would be able to ‘tell’ whether Alice wanted love or money, by observing
her behaviour in other circumstances - such as when she knew what Bob’s hand was. However, when analysing
the behaviour of other humans, we are already making huge amounts of normative assumptions already. See
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YfQGZderiaGv3kBJ8/figuring-out-what-alice-wants-non-human-alice
for a longer discussion of this.
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Code 1: Two possible algorithms for Alice.
(a) Alice algorithm for money.
Alice poker algorithm I
1: Inputs: Alicecards, board,Bobbehave
2: Pwin = cardestimate(Alicecards, board)
3: if Pwin > 0.5:
4: return ‘call’
5: else:
6: return ‘fold’
7: end if
(b) Alice algorithm for love.
Alice poker algorithm II
1: Inputs: Alicecards, board,Bobbehave
2: Pwin = playerestimate(Bobbehave)
3: if Pwin < 0.5:
4: return ‘call’
5: else:
6: return ‘fold’
7: end if
understand the preferences of a human, the problem is grounding the ‘symbols’ in the human brain
— whatever those might be — rather than in a computer program.
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